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Sophie A. Jones *
In a 1981 essay on his writing process, Raymond Carver attrib-
utes his turn to the short story to a crisis of attention:
When I was 27, back in 1966, I found I was having trouble con-
centrating my attention on long narrative fiction. For a time I
experienced difficulty in trying to read it as well as in attempt-
ing to write it. My attention span had gone out on me; I no lon-
ger had the patience to try to write novels. It’s an involved story,
too tedious to talk about here. But I know it has much to do now
with why I write poems and short stories. Get in, get out. Don’t
linger.
In Carver’s account, his writing finds its form according to his fluc-
tuating patterns of attention and distraction. Defined in opposition to
“long narrative fiction,” his short stories and poems are notable
chiefly for their brevity. While Carver’s mode in this essay is pri-
marily introspective, his performance of distracted impatience im-
plicitly raises the question of readerly attention. Is the “involved
story” of Carver’s compositional process “too tedious” for him, for
his readers, or simply for everyone concerned?1
The ambiguous relationship between literary form and that cu-
rious dimension of subjectivity known as the attention span was a
preoccupation of the US literary world in the 1980s, the period when
Carver became the figurehead of a style that came to be consti-
tuted—though not without dissent—as US literary minimalism. In a
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1985 review, David Leavitt identifies a new group of writers who
“have in general limited themselves to the short story, a form they
seem to find most appropriate to the age of shortened attention
spans, fractured marriages and splintering families in which they
grew up.” The following year, John Barth published “A Few Words
About Minimalism,” an essay in which he links the mode to “an
ever-dwindling readerly attention span,” among other social factors.
The cautious generosity of these commentaries about the specific
authors under discussion—Barth lists “Frederick Barthelme, Ann
Beattie, Raymond Carver, Bobbie Ann Mason, James Robison,
Mary Robison and Tobias Wolff” as exemplars of minimalist
style—only throws into relief the widespread conviction, consistent
throughout these commentaries, that literary minimalism was some-
how entangled with the nation’s attention span.
These anxieties over attention spans did not, of course, take
place in a hermetically sealed literary culture. In 1980, the third edi-
tion of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) had intro-
duced a new condition: attention deficit disorder, or ADD. Both
broader and more nebulous than the condition it replaced, hyperki-
netic reaction of childhood, ADD extended its diagnostic gaze
beyond the boisterous boys of popular legend: according to the
DSM-III, pathological inattention could exist with or without hyper-
activity (41). The revised version of the DSM-III, published in 1987,
drew hyperactivity and inattention into a combined diagnosis, atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Since then, the relative
significance of hyperactivity and inattention has continued to be
reformulated in subsequent editions of the manual. Under the spot-
light of these post-1980 reformulations, a new pool of patients
emerged, from the quiet schoolgirl gazing incessantly out of the win-
dow to the 40-something underachiever drifting restlessly from job
to job.2 Notions of pathological attention had been circulating in the
medical world for a long time—the Scottish physician Alexander
Crichton was writing on “attention, and its diseases” in 1798—but it
was from 1980 that the contemporary psychiatric model of disor-
dered attention was codified in the DSM, identified in the consulting
room, disseminated in the media, and—as I argue here—filtered into
literary critical discourse.
How does a neurobehavioral diagnostic category like ADD
come to describe literary works as well as patients?3 I contend that
the trope of “minimalism’s attention deficit” reflects a late
twentieth-century insecurity, common to both literature and psychia-
try, about objects understood as resisting interpretation. The
“minimalism debates” have been well documented. While the mode
is closely associated with the editor and teacher Gordon Lish, who
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(notoriously) steered Carver toward the spare aesthetic for which he
is known, the label “minimalist” was in fact rejected by many, if not
most of Lish’s authors.4 Now, as Margaret Doherty observes, liter-
ary minimalism is mainly “noted by literary historians for the heated
controversy it generated in newspapers and literary magazines,
where defenders and proponents of the movement exchanged salvos
throughout the 1980s” (88). Less well-documented are the ways in
which these debates positioned minimalist writing as an affront to
the project of literary hermeneutics itself. According to its detrac-
tors, literary minimalism resisted interpretation not to advance the
interest of avant-garde difficulty (which might have been accept-
able) but to disguise its meaninglessness and triviality—qualities
that rendered the task of literary interpretation precarious, perhaps
even moot. Here I neither intend to enter into the minimalism
debates nor seek to define or defend the term’s utility as a category
of literary analysis. Instead, I approach US literary minimalism as an
object constituted through the various screeds, dismissals, defenses,
and curious probings of authors, journalists, and academic critics in
the late twentieth century.
The essays, articles, and reviews that helped to establish liter-
ary minimalism draw frequently on notions of attention deficit, a
concept that was itself bound up with a debate about the fate of in-
terpretation and analysis at the end of the twentieth century. ADD
was codified as a condition just as the psychiatric profession shifted
its allegiance from psychoanalysis to descriptive psychiatry. Within
the terms of this new paradigm, the attention deficit patient would
be diagnosed and treated according to a standardized list of observ-
able symptoms, rather than analyzed by an individual expert. The
trope of minimalism’s attention deficit, in this context, was never a
simple slur: literary minimalism was seen to resemble the ADD pa-
tient, not simply because both were in deficit, but because both were
defined in terms of a descriptive surface that yielded no hidden
depths for expert excavation.
Such concerns resonate with recent debates about the relative
function and value of interpretation and description in literary stud-
ies. While minimalism’s critics saw the mode’s descriptive tenden-
cies as a sign of its deficient attention span, recent work by Heather
Love, Sharon Marcus, and Stephen Best has emphasized the power
of literary description to repair or enhance attention. A revaluation
of the terms of the minimalism debates is evident, albeit implicitly,
in this so-called descriptive turn in literary studies. Witness, for in-
stance, Love’s endorsement of a “minimalist but painstaking work
of description” that “undermines the ethical charisma of the critic”
(387). Here we can see anxieties around the waning of interpretive
authority refigured as strengths: Love suggests that critics should
[L]iterary
minimalism was seen
to resemble the ADD
patient . . . because
both were defined in
terms of a descriptive
surface that yielded
no hidden depths for
expert excavation.
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become minimalists by embracing description. Using similar lan-
guage in their article “Surface Reading,” Best and Marcus identify
description with a practice of “minimal critical agency” and a ten-
dency to be “relatively neutral” about the object of study (17, 16).
This scholarly work on description is one dimension of a
broader movement variously termed the post-critical or post-
hermeneutic turn. For Rita Felski and Elizabeth S. Anker, this turn
involves a self-conscious shift away from a “diagnostic quality of
critique” grounded in psychoanalysis (Anker and Felski 4). Just as
Sigmund Freud analyzed his patients, so too “a generation of critics
scrutinized literary and cultural texts for their accidental or involun-
tary betrayal of repressed meanings,” argues Felski (61–62). What
Felski, after Paul Ricoeur, calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion” has,
perhaps, informed existing scholarly analyses of minimalism as a lit-
erary negotiation with trauma (9).5 I here argue that, in the context
of literary minimalism, trauma and ADD have functioned as alterna-
tive paradigms for the act Felski terms “diagnostic” reading. Where
the trauma paradigm finds hidden etiological depths in minimalist
literature, the ADD paradigm sees only the symptomatic surface. In
this context, description is aligned with diagnostic reading too. One
question that I derive from these debates is whether the notion of an
ADD literary aesthetics, grounded in a critical disability studies that
is far from neutral, might provide a route out of the dichotomy of
analysis and description—and thus model a new way of understand-
ing the relationship between literature and psychiatric diagnosis.
To pursue this question, I turn in the latter part of this article
from criticism of minimalism to the literature itself. In particular, I
read Mary Robison, a paradigmatic (if reluctant) minimalist whose
2001 work Why Did I Ever: A Novel dismantles the minimalism’s at-
tention deficit trope. My reading of Robison’s novel draws on the no-
tion of cripistemology, as put forward by disability theorists Merri Lisa
Johnson, Robert McRuer, and Lisa Duggan, to propose a new way of
conceptualizing the relationships connecting attention disorders,
trauma, and minimalist literature. Moving away from the opposition
between analytic depth and surface description, I suggest cripistemo-
logical reading as a framework for thinking through Robison’s literary
negotiation with neurobehavioral disability. To begin, however, it is
necessary to return to the origins of the charge of minimalism’s atten-
tion deficit: in literary debates of the 1980s and 1990s.
1. Forms of Inscrutability: Literary Minimalism and ADD
Depthless, placeless, hyperreal: the adjectives often attached to
minimalist writing are common to broader assessments of
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postmodernism. Contemporary commentators often drew parallels,
implicit or explicit, between literary minimalism’s affective flatness
and postmodern culture’s move away from depth models, as Fredric
Jameson would have it. Barth, the canonical metafictionalist, draws
minimalism into the orbit of postmodernism when he states that the
mode has been both “praised and damned under such labels as
‘K-Mart realism,’ ‘hick chic,’ ‘Diet-Pepsi minimalism’ and
‘post-Vietnam, post-literary, postmodernist blue-collar neo-early-
Hemingwayism.’” Thus, while recent scholarship has often
positioned minimalism as a realist counterpoint to the kind of
postmodern metafiction produced by Barth and his peers, its con-
temporaneous reception points to a more complex negotiation with
the postmodern.6 If the author of postmodern metafiction is
displaced by the text, then the author of minimalist fiction is dis-
placed differently: according to their critics, minimalist authors are
not dead but in a state of cognitive deficit.
This idea is at work in fiction writer John Biguenet’s frag-
mented 1985 essay “Notes of a Disaffected Reader,” which adopts
the telegraphic style it critiques. Biguenet asserts, “The abrupt sen-
tence forms the basic unit of minimalist prose. It is syntax without
an attention span” (42). His phrasing makes the text, rather than the
writer, the bearer of deficiency—an appropriate rhetorical move,
given that his broader argument associates minimalist literature with
poststructuralist theories that decenter the author. Biguenet declares
that minimalists “are the slaves of Derrida”: in relinquishing their
status as authors, he contends, they retreat into solipsistic paraphrase
(45). As a result, “[t]he reader, like a child with crayons hunched
over a coloring book, authors the story” (44). Significantly, the
reader who displaces the author is here configured as an intellectu-
ally inferior child, perhaps even the kind who, by the mid-1980s,
might well have been diagnosed with ADD.
Barth is more ambivalent and sometimes even hopeful about
literary minimalism’s stylistic value, but the association of minimal-
ist literature with cognitive deficit still rings loud and clear in his ar-
ticle. Noting a “national decline in reading and writing skills” that
has percolated into graduate writing programs, Barth elaborates:
Rarely in their own writing, whatever its considerable other
merits, will one find a sentence of any syntactical complexity,
for example, and inasmuch as a language’s repertoire of other-
than-basic syntactical devices permits its users to articulate
other-than-basic thoughts and feelings, Dick-and-Jane prose
tends to be emotionally and intellectually poorer than Henry
James prose. Among the great minimalist writers, this impover-
ishment is elected and strategic: simplification in the interest of
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strength, or of some other value. Among the less great it may be
faute de mieux. Among today’s “common readers” it is pan-
demic. Along with this decline, an ever-dwindling readerly at-
tention span.
Barth’s ambivalent assessment of minimalism tips over into critique
thanks to his style, which performs the “syntactical complexity”
against which the minimalists are assessed and (often) found lack-
ing. Meanwhile, his reference to “Dick-and-Jane prose” recalls
Biguenet’s imbrication of minimalism and infancy. For Barth, the
understated prose of minimalist literature presents a problem for the
critic: how, in the absence of “Henry James prose,” is one to tell the
difference between simplicity and childishness, or style and deficit?
The directness of minimalist style, he suggests, makes it ever more
difficult to distinguish great writers from mediocre imitators—a
problem exacerbated by the impoverished attention span of the
(childish) common reader.
If Biguenet and Barth were concerned with the abdication of
authorial primacy in minimalist writing, some commentators were
vexed by what they saw as the diminishment of critical authority
augured by minimalism. In his Talents and Technicians: Literary
Chic and the New Assembly-Line Fiction (1992), John W. Aldridge,
for one, bemoans the waning influence of literary criticism. The
problem, for Aldridge, can be traced to a literary market that
obstructs “the symbiotic relationship between serious criticism and
the production of literature” and instead treats writing like an assem-
bly line (8). But, Aldridge says, the fault also lies with minimalist
literature: a writer like Amy Hempel, he charges, “offers us too little
evidence for interpretation” (72). Taking aim at minimalism’s frayed
link between evidence and interpretation, Aldridge suggests that its
authors obstruct the critic’s main objective: to analyze.
In the 1980s, psychiatry was entangled in its own set of debates
about hermeneutic models of knowledge. The DSM-III, which intro-
duced ADD as a diagnosis, represented a major sea change in psy-
chiatric practice as the manual moved away from psychoanalysis
and adopted a descriptive approach chiefly concerned with identify-
ing symptoms, not interpreting them to discover their causes. The
volume explained in its introduction that, because most of the disor-
ders it listed had unknown causes, it would adopt an approach that
was largely “atheoretical with regard to etiology or pathophysiologi-
cal process” (DSM-III 7). Where the DSM-II (1968) had explicitly
signaled causation with its term hyperkinetic reaction of childhood
(50; emphasis added), the DSM-III offered a new “atheoretical”
term for the condition: attention deficit disorder. The volume’s lon-
ger list of diagnostic criteria for the newly conceptualized condition
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restricted its focus to behavioral symptoms, such as “often fails
to finish things he or she starts” and “frequently calls out in class”
(43–44).
The DSM’s turn to descriptive psychiatry was controversial. It
gave psychiatrists “an agreed-upon language for naming what they
saw, yet this language did not explicitly engage the issue of the na-
ture of the disorders it named,” according to the psychoanalytic psy-
chiatrist Mitchell Wilson, who observes that “while the clarity of the
language facilitated communication, it did so by bracketing what
had hitherto been essential clinical concepts in psychiatry.” One ef-
fect of this bracketing is, he adds, a “narrowing of the psychiatric
gaze” marked by a “loss of the concept of depth of mind, a loss of
the concept of the unconscious” (408).
This charge of a “narrow[ed]” psychiatric gaze resonates with
the critiques leveled at literary minimalism during the same period.
Just as psychoanalytic psychiatrists saw the DSM-III as an attack on
their authoritative clinical judgment, so did some literary critics and
authors see minimalist literature as an affront to their autonomy. The
shift to descriptive psychiatry appeared to challenge the authority of
the individual clinician, whose professional opinion counted for
much less in an era of standardized classification. According to the
psychiatrist Howard Berk, “the DSM-III gets rid of the castle of neu-
rosis and replaces it with a diagnostic Levittown” (qtd. in Spiegel).
Berk’s parallel between the standardized housing of the postwar sub-
urban development and the standardized diagnostic categories of the
DSM-III recalls Aldridge’s notion of “assembly-line fiction”: both
literary critic and psychiatrist claim to bear witness to a new era in
which a systematizing approach is seen as replacing professional
discernment and judgment. This new approach to psychiatric assess-
ment entailed a new account of the symptom. As Jennifer Fleissner
has noted, there is a radical difference between Freud’s suggestion
that “it is difficult to attribute too much sense to [the symptom]” and
neuropsychiatry’s tendency to “strongly reject the notion of attribut-
ing any deep hermeneutic significance to the individual symptom”
(387, 388). Fleissner articulates a question that remains coded in the
dominant critiques of minimalism: What happens to literature when
the symptom can no longer be interpreted? Literary minimalism was
constituted as an object of critical appraisal in the shadow of this
question.
The insecure status of the critic in an age of meaningless symp-
toms is an evident concern in the novelist Madison Smartt Bell’s
scathing 1986 Harper’s Magazine essay on minimalism, “Less is
Less: The Dwindling American Short Story,” an influential article
on which Aldridge, among others, draws. Bemoaning minimalist lit-
erature’s “obsessive concern for surface detail,” Bell describes
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Leavitt’s comment connecting the short story to waning attention
spans as “perturbing” (65). In contrasting the new short story with
its forebears, Bell complains that, while Ernest Hemingway con-
structed entire life histories for his characters, which then became re-
sounding absences in his prose, in the minimalist short story, “the
unspoken has simply been left unthought” (66). This comment might
just as well critique descriptive psychiatry’s concern with surface
symptoms and lack of interest in their unconscious roots. Yet, inter-
estingly, Bell illustrates his castigation of minimalism with an ex-
ception that garners his rare, if muted, praise: Hempel’s “In the
Cemetery Where Al Jolson Is Buried,” from her debut collection
Reasons to Live (1985).
In Hempel’s story, the narrator recounts the time she spent
with her dying best friend in a hospital. The narrator, at her friend’s
behest, distracts her with trivia:
“Tell me things I won’t mind forgetting,” she said. “Make it
useless stuff or skip it.”
I began. I told her insects fly through rain, missing every
drop, never getting wet. I told her no one in America owned a
tape recorder before Bing Crosby did. I told her the shape of the
moon is like a banana—you see it looking full, you’re seeing it
end-on. (29)
Bell exempts this story from his broader critique of minimalism be-
cause its “strategy of distraction” eventually “rises above the trivial”
to symbolize the narrator’s inability to confront her friend’s death
(66). In Hempel’s other stories, he maintains, “the trivial remains
just that”: a meaningless aesthetic of distraction that resists the act
of interpretation (66). For Bell, then, the trivial is acceptable only
when it conceals a trauma that the critic can probe. The idea that lan-
guage might be reduced to a meaningless symptom, closed to inter-
pretation, is what troubles Bell about minimalism. By making an
exception of Hempel’s story, Bell identifies the other works under
discussion, including the remaining stories in Reasons to Live, with
a crisis of interpretability engendered by a body of writing that, like
the symptoms of attention disorders, can be read but not analyzed.
Trauma is one of the multiple factors Barth lists as possible
contributors to the emergence of minimalism. The “national hang-
over from the Vietnam War,” he explains, was “felt by many to be a
trauma literally and figuratively unspeakable” and thus amenable to
the opacity of minimalist prose. In subsequent decades, the traumatic
reading of minimalism came to dominate scholarly criticism of the
mode. Indeed, theories of trauma loomed large in the broader field
of literary scholarship from the 1990s onward, following the DSM-
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III’s introduction of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a dis-
crete category. This development, notes Ruth Leys in Trauma: A
Genealogy (2000), was part of “an essentially political struggle by
psychiatrists, social workers, activists and others to acknowledge the
postwar sufferings of the Vietnam War veteran,” as well as the long-
term effects of childhood sexual abuse (5). During this period, a
poststructuralist academic model of trauma was forged that resisted
dichotomizing the psychoanalytic and the neuropsychiatric para-
digms. This model, most powerfully associated with the work of
Cathy Caruth, emphasizes the paradox of trauma: “that the most di-
rect seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to
know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of
belatedness” (94).
This statement points to what notions of traumatized minimal-
ism have in common with notions of minimalism’s attention deficit.
Both tropes use psychiatric terminology to make sense of the rela-
tionship between surface and depth, or the known and the unknown,
in literature. Yet trauma, an established paradigm in academic liter-
ary criticism, does not carry the derogatory charge of ADD. There
are important differences between the two diagnoses: while the ca-
pacious category of trauma has allowed Caruth to integrate the psy-
chiatric model of PTSD with earlier psychoanalytic frameworks,
attention disorders are more narrowly aligned with the post-1980
paradigm of descriptive psychiatry. If trauma preserves an interpre-
tive role for both the literary critic and the psychoanalyst, ADD
presents an opaque face marked with what Fleissner might term
senseless symptoms. Thus, for Bell, Hempel’s only good story is the
one in which distraction is transformed into an expression of
trauma—a trauma that gives the reader, as well as the psychothera-
pist, something to do.
The tension between these paradigms in the wider culture is on
display in a landmark narrative of adult ADD diagnosis, Frank
Wolkenberg’s 1987 New York Times article “Out of a Darkness.”
Here Wolkenberg describes his “overwhelming relief” once he had
been diagnosed with ADD. He had previously suspected that his
problems were “linked to [his] mother’s death when [he] was 12,
and to hearing, as a child, about [his] family’s experiences during
the Holocaust.” He also expresses relief at the news that his difficul-
ties with organization, focus, and mood swings do not signify uncon-
scious traumatic experience; they refer, instead, to what he calls “a
dysfunction of genetic origin, most likely a chemical failure in the
system of the brain.” Wolkenberg comes to know himself as a
“neurochemical self,” to borrow Nikolas Rose’s term, and he is reas-
sured by this new understanding of his behavior because, unlike the
trauma of a mother’s death, neurochemistry can be altered with the
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help of Ritalin (Rose 46). Wolkenberg acknowledges that the symp-
toms of ADD are usually associated with childhood but takes note
that “specialists now believe that it affects at least 2 million
American adults,” despite the lack of “conclusive data” about the
condition.
It is significant that Wolkenberg’s desired brain scans that
would reveal the mysteries of attention disorders were not yet a real-
ity in 1987—indeed, by the twenty-first century, ADHD diagnoses
still depend on behavioral assessments rather than neuroimaging.
That the “chemical failure” thought to underlie attention disorders
could not be detected by tests or scans was, in a way, beside the
point in light of the DSM-III’s descriptive approach, which left a
blank space for scientific speculation about the “true cause” of
ADD. The introduction to the DSM-III propounds the radical de-
mocracy of descriptive psychiatry. It assures readers that “[t]he ma-
jor justification for the generally atheoretical approach taken in
DSM-III with regard to etiology is that the inclusion of etiological
theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of
varying theoretical orientations, since it would not be possible to
present all reasonable etiological theories for each disorder” (7). Yet
the volume was published during the ascent to dominance of biolog-
ical psychiatry; its expulsion of psychoanalytic terminology was
seen by some to give free rein to biological approaches, as Matthew
Smith has observed (97). Meanwhile, a close alliance had developed
between attention disorder research and pharmaceutical firms: Ciba,
the manufacturer of Ritalin, directed money to ADD research and
patient advocacy organizations, as well as advertising directly to
psychiatric practitioners (Smith 94–95; Schwarz 108–9). Despite its
claims to neutrality, the DSM’s descriptive psychiatry seemed partic-
ularly well suited to act as scaffolding for neurobiological
approaches.
Bound to the promissory structure of neurochemistry, accounts
of attention disorders in the post-1980 period turn the paradox of
trauma inside out: they gesture toward inaccessible knowledge that
beckons from the future, not from the past. The knowledge that
would account for trauma lies in the past, even if that past cannot be
comprehended; conversely, the knowledge that would explain atten-
tion disorders is always pending. This point is crucial: within the
parameters forged by the DSM, it is not that attention disorders
cannot be fully known, but that they are not yet fully known. As the
psychiatrist Jerrold Maxmen puts it in his The New Psychiatry
(1985), “DSM-III spotlights the enormous gaps in factual informa-
tion about mental disorders. From now on, a major goal of psychiat-
ric research is to fill these gaps” (58). As Maxmen’s comments
demonstrate, the DSM’s concerted marking of its own
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epistemological limits points toward their future transcendence. The
minimalism of descriptive psychiatry produces a blank space for sci-
entific speculation; this is the space to which Wolkenberg appeals
when he speaks of the brain scans that will one day reveal the mys-
teries of ADD. This context indicates how trauma and ADD have
functioned as divergent conceptual frameworks for making sense of
literary minimalism’s opacity. Minimalism became the stage for an
uneasy collision of psychiatric paradigms focused on inaccessible
knowledge but with different temporal inclinations. If trauma theory
posits a crisis of representation whereby the past becomes inaccessi-
ble to memory and expressible only in terms of the mute symptom,
ADD’s mute symptoms have no history at all—only a future.
At this point, it is worth briefly returning to Hempel and the
conception of knowledge established in “In the Cemetery Where Al
Jolson is Buried.” Bell’s preoccupation with the traumatic origin of
the trivial information in Hempel’s story sidesteps the important fact
that much of this information is erroneous. The dying friend, be-
cause she is dying, does not care whether the information she
receives is true or false. Indeed, she specifically requests “useless
stuff” that she “won’t mind forgetting.” For Hempel’s narrator, the
unseen part of the moon prompts a whimsical story, not a quest for
the truth. There is an important difference between the strategically
erroneous “information” in Hempel’s story, which positions itself
against the quest for verisimilitude, and the “description” of the
DSM, which takes great care to delineate the known, which can be
stated, from the unknown, which cannot.
I would suggest that the pursuit of certainty implicit in the
DSM-III’s descriptive psychiatry can be compared to recent defenses
of the value of description in literary studies. Working in the orbit of
the postcritical turn, Marcus, Love, and Best, among others, have
addressed what they see as the unjust denigration of both creative
and critical literary description. In their coauthored article “Building
a Better Description,” they suggest incorporating “the uncertainty of
any attempt to describe into descriptions themselves” (10). The de-
scriptive psychiatry of the DSM arguably does just that: the vol-
ume’s exclusion of etiology embeds gaps in psychiatric knowledge
into its diagnostic descriptions. This acknowledgment of uncertainty,
however, coexists with a commitment to the pursuit of certainty
within a neurobiological paradigm. The idealized neutrality of de-
scription, supposedly embedded in its necessary incompletion, gives
way in this case to an investment in imagined future certainty. The
act of circumscribing the limits of knowledge about a psychiatric
condition like ADD works, counterintuitively, to sustain a fantasy of
future neurobiological certainty and psychopharmaceutical
correction.
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A further parallel might be drawn between the descriptive psy-
chiatry of the DSM and the descriptive turn in literary studies: a
commitment to overcoming deficits of attention. Marcus, Love, and
Best mention the reparative powers of attention several times in
“Building a Better Description.” In response to the question, “Why
describe?” they assert:
Because describing and descriptions can produce pleasure—
granular, slow, compressed, attentive, appreciative—as when
Roland Barthes reproduces, codes, and interprets every sentence
of a Balzac novella in S/Z, then reproduces the text again in its
entirety. Because description can make us more attentive, as
when we produce an audio description, copy a painting, analyze
or perform a piece of music, and annotate or memorize a text.
Because description can allow us both to see more and to look
more attentively, more fully, and more selectively. (14; empha-
sis added)
This is a departure from earlier endorsements of critical description,
such as Susan Sontag’s in her 1964 essay “Against Interpretation.”
If Sontag is primarily concerned with doing justice to aesthetic
form, Marcus, Love, and Best are interested in the ethical disposition
of the critic. Description, in this account, is not diagnostic but thera-
peutic. Prized as an ethical attribute, description becomes a form of
cognitive enhancement or psychological therapy, automatically en-
gendering better habits of attention. This account of description res-
onates with the DSM’s approach: while the manual is not itself
therapeutic, the APA implicitly identifies descriptive minimalism
with a neutrality that (in its view) can engender successful
treatment.
If the turn to literary description replaces diagnostic reading
with therapeutic reading, what happens to ADD? Is it possible to
speak of an ADD aesthetics that avoids both the derogatory charge
of diagnostic reading and the therapeutic promise of descriptive
reading? One approach to such a challenge can be found in the work
of Robison, who has (to her professed dismay) been marketed and
read as a minimalist since the late 1970s. Robison’s 2001 novel Why
Did I Ever involves a parodic, critical return to the minimalism’s at-
tention deficit trope. The novel, I contend, engages with the relation-
ship between trauma and ADD without forcing these conditions into
a binary framework that opposes the unchangeable traumatic past to
the correctable neurobiological future. Instead, Robison adopts a
form of writing that I call cripistemological, adopting a term coined
by Lisa Duggan and further theorized by Johnson, McRuer, Jasbir
Puar, and others.
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“Cripistemology,” or “thinking from the critical, social, and
personal position of disability” (Johnson and McRuer,
“Cripistemologies” 134), involves, in Puar’s words:
a critique of the notion of epistemology itself, a displacement
not only of conventional ways of knowing and organizing
knowledge, but also of the mandate of knowing itself, of the
consolidation of knowledge. This supplements a cripistemology
with “crip(s) at the beginning or center of the production of
knowledge” by offering another reading of cripistemology as a
matter of debilitating contemporary forms of knowing with
forms of unknowing, sensing, refusing to know, akin to Jack’s
formulation, and, further, a matter of challenging the status of
knowledge itself. (qtd. in Johnson and McRuer, “Proliferating
Cripistemologies” 163–64)7
Puar’s intervention here points to the value of cripistemology, and
critical disability studies more widely, as an alternative to the inter-
pretation/description binary. Minimalist literature was framed as a
mode of attention deficit writing because it was seen to resist forms
of interpretive knowledge. The clinical account of attention disor-
ders, however, cannot be said to resist “the mandate of knowing
itself”; rather, the DSM points out the gaps in knowledge in order
that psychiatric research might fill them. Robison’s Why Did I Ever,
in contrast, performs Puar’s project of “debilitating contemporary
forms of knowing with forms of unknowing.” In so doing, Robison
refigures the interaction of trauma and ADD through a cripistemo-
logical lens.
2. Mary Robison’s Post-Minimalist Cripistemology
Robison came to prominence as a writer of short fiction in the
late 1970s and, to date, she has published four collections of stories
and four novels. Why Did I Ever, her third novel, is narrated by
Money Breton, a woman with ADD. Before I turn to it, I want to
consider Robison’s initial hailing as a founding minimalist author in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Anatole Broyard’s review of her first short
story collection, Days (1979), exemplifies Robison’s reception.
Deploying a familiar vocabulary of inscrutability, uninterpretability,
and minimal scale, Broyard wonders “whether it is a virtue of Miss
Robison to have offered me a novel experience or whether she has
simply imposed on me a scale of values that I cannot interpret.” He
continues, “Some of Miss Robison’s sentences achieve a rather im-
pressive inscrutability.” Finally, he admits: “I’m divided in my mind
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whether to be grateful to Miss Robison for calling my attention to
the minuscule mysteries that make up the nitty-gritty of our anxi-
eties, or whether to see her as one of those people who root around
in trash cans.” Setting the tone for a whole generation of critical
evaluations of minimalism, Broyard all but wonders: Is the literature
deficient or am I?
Robison herself rejects the term minimalism. As she puts it in a
2001 interview:
I detested it. Subtractionist, I preferred. That at least implied a
little effort. Minimalists sounded like we had tiny vocabularies
and few ways to use the few words we knew. I thought the term
was demeaning; reductive, clouded, misleading, lazily borrowed
from painting and that it should have been put back where it
belonged. (M. Murray)
It is notable that Robison discusses minimalism in the past tense: in-
deed, by 2001, the moment of US literary minimalism was widely
seen to have passed. Why Did I Ever, Robison’s first publication
since 1991’s Subtraction, marked the end of a decade of writer’s
block; with it, she launched her latest work into a new literary era,
marked, in part, by the success of maximalist American novels by
the likes of David Foster Wallace and Jonathan Franzen.8
Yet Why Did I Ever was a milestone for another reason.
Robison had moved from Knopf, which published her first five
books under Gordon Lish’s editorship, to Counterpoint Press, with
which she published two more books following Why Did I Ever: the
short story collection Tell Me (2002) and One D.O.A, One on the
Way (2009), a novel set in post-Katrina New Orleans. Tell Me bears
traces of Robison’s fraught relationship with Lish: the collection is
purged of his editorial contributions, restoring the original stories as
they were edited by Roger Angell for The New Yorker.9 “The differ-
ences were significant to me,” Robison stated in a 2003 interview
with Michael Silverblatt on his radio show Bookworm (1989–),
where she expressed regret at the number of anthologies featuring
the Lish-edited versions of these early works.
Yet Robison’s post-2000 output is not only a project of restora-
tion. Her two recent novels write back to the moment of minimal-
ism, subverting the aesthetic of radical cutting associated with
Lish’s editorial practice and reworking the metaphors of attention
and distraction through which minimalism was constituted. In a re-
cent appreciation of Why Did I Ever, Blake Butler proclaims that the
novel distinguishes itself from “so much modern writing these days
trying to find a way to explain our situation as plush but dire, free
but under surveillance, exhausted but ADD.” Using ADD
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adjectivally, Butler echoes the doomsaying about contemporary at-
tention spans that characterized the 1980s emergence of minimal-
ism. Yet Why Did I Ever’s interest in ADD runs far deeper than
Butler’s comment recognizes. Robison, who has discussed her own
ADD diagnosis in interviews, gives the condition to her protagonist,
Money, as well. Literalizing the critical trope of minimalism’s atten-
tion deficit, Robison practices a cripistemological revision of its
premises.
While Robison’s screwball dialogue and oblique narration are
consistent across her body of work, Why Did I Ever represents a dis-
tinct stylistic shift. Her early fiction, which has been described as
hyperreal, displays a formal fidelity to the traditions of the novel
and short story.10 Why Did I Ever, in contrast, is structurally frag-
mented. Subtitled A Novel (all Robison’s books announce their
genre in their subtitles), it is, arguably, not immediately recognizable
as one. The book is divided into 536 short sections—some num-
bered; others titled with what seem like excerpts of ambient conver-
sation drawn from Money’s chaotic life, such as “And Yet,” “And
Then a Kitchen Fire,” and “This Was Your Idea.”
Composed on a series of index cards after a period of writer’s
block, Why Did I Ever was probably not what Barth was thinking of
when he reminisced about the sustained attention that novels de-
mand.11 Indeed, Robison has publicly linked the book’s episodic
structure to the willed state of distraction in which it was composed.
In the same interview quoted above, she contextualizes the book’s
composition:
[V]arious horrible things had happened, as they sometimes will,
and I was having difficulty. I was having more than difficulty.
Like a repulsive videotape was on automatic replay in my head.
So to get through, I began scribbling notes. I would go out, take
a notebook. Or drive, or park wherever and take notes. I would
note anything left. Anything that still seemed funny or scary or
involving for four seconds. Some berserk conversation I over-
heard. The crap on the radio. This big, brilliant cat. Ridiculous
weather. Then it was months before I read over the scribbles
and realized they had a steady voice, and that there were charac-
ters and themes. Although none of the material was organized at
all except around my urgent need to distract myself. (M.
Murray)
Distraction, Robison tells us, is more than just the subject of the
novel, operating also as a structuring principle during its composi-
tion. Described by the author as a process of assembly, the novel’s
composition involved the numbering and arranging of these
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fragmented “scribbles” into a narrative. While Robison’s reference
to assembly recalls Aldridge’s caricature of standardized “assembly-
line fiction,” her idiosyncratic process generates a more complex vi-
sion of what it might mean—or fail to mean—to write in a state of
distraction.
Robison’s description of feeling as if “a repulsive videotape
was on automatic replay in [her] head” blurs the boundary between
distracted and traumatic experience. Echoing her account of its pro-
cess of composition, Why Did I Ever explores the interrelation of
trauma and ADD in the life of its narrator, Money, whose son,
Paulie, is recovering from a violent sexual assault and whose daugh-
ter, Mev, is addicted to methadone. The novel, by exploring
Money’s distress as she confronts what has happened to Paulie, rep-
resents the complex entanglement of attention disorders and trau-
matic experience without seeking a final explanation for their
interrelation. This refusal to dichotomize trauma and ADD emerges
particularly in passages dealing with Money’s troubled relationship
with the ADD drug Ritalin. On a break during one of her long, in-
somniac night drives, Money mulls her predicament:
I take the corner booth at IHOP, where perhaps I can last until
two. Thinking about my lean and suntanned son. Weeping into
a napkin. Ignoring a short stack and a side of links that, anyway,
would be tastier if I ate their depiction on the menu.
I have long thought pharmaceutical drugs were the solu-
tion and I was right about that and that’s correct. Still, you have
to consider, with even the best prescription drugs, who it is
who’s taking them. (97)
Here the novel is not concerned with debunking pharmaceutical
treatments or suggesting that ADD is an industrially conjured myth:
in a conversation with her mother, Money describes the condition as
a “birth defect” that she hasn’t “been able to shake” (37). Rather, it
uses Money’s growing ambivalence about her use of Ritalin to inter-
rogate the conditions under which pharmaceutical interventions
might fail to address the specific circumstances—and, specifically,
the traumatic experience—of “who it is who’s taking them.”
Why Did I Ever explores what happens when, as a result of
trauma, there is no desire or capacity for heightened focus. Instead,
there is an “urgent need to distract” oneself, to borrow Robison’s
words about her experience of writing the novel. The novel pursues
this question by showing how Money’s distress transforms the way
she inhabits her ADD diagnosis, opening up a space between her ex-
perience and dominant clinical accounts of what it means to be im-
paired by an attention disorder. Such accounts tend to emphasize
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economic productivity. Since the DSM-III, the APA has explicitly
and repeatedly contextualized attention deficit behavior with refer-
ence to its implications for work, whether at school or in employ-
ment. Why Did I Ever both echoes and subverts the DSM’s emphasis
on productivity. A precariously employed script editor, Money
acknowledges that her quirks have lost her contracts with studios,
admitting that “they had to sit on me to get me to work” (88). She
also observes, however, that her colleagues both stigmatize and fe-
tishize her condition:
The only thing I really have going for me is my attention deficit.
It’s very, very impressive to these people. How I forget to col-
lect my checks, or fail to kiss the ring of whichever the hell one
is the studio president.
On the debit side, I missed removing an electric roller this
morning and did the sushi lunch and the studio meeting with it
lodged in the back of my hair. (121)
Money’s caustic accounting of her condition’s credits and debits
reflects the pressure neoliberal capitalism exerts on ways of concep-
tualizing attention disorders, a pressure that increasingly searches
for the condition’s economic advantages as well as its deficits. As
Stuart Murray has observed, “a culture of work acceleration and
multiple-project multitasking or, conversely, sustained concentration
and single tasking, might seem to welcome the forms of cognitive
variation inherent in some neurobehavioral conditions, such as
autism.” In the case of attention disorders, popular psychologists
such as Edward Hallowell have drawn attention to the advantages
wrought by the states of “hyperfocus” experienced by some people
with the condition (177–78).
The limits of psychiatric knowledge of attention disorders cre-
ate a space for speculation not only about the profession’s future
knowledge of the condition but also about the individual patient’s
economically productive posttreatment future. In the contemporary
moment, the “deficit” of ADHD has been reframed as an opportu-
nity not only for treatment but also for enhancement, and the stimu-
lants used to treat the condition are lauded for their ability to
augment productivity rates, even for those who have not received a
diagnosis. In Why Did I Ever, Money opts out of such dreams of
more and better labor, while yearning to be free of work altogether:
“If I could take a break from work I could read all my books, contact
everyone, clean everything, learn to play the drums, drive to
Quebec, Canada, and I would try to come back right away” (182).
The passage tests what it might mean to conceptualize attention dis-
orders without reference to their impact on economic productivity.
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With its representation of the imbrication of Money’s ADD
with her working life, Why Did I Ever engages with the problem of
what it means to diagnose ADD when the horizons of psychiatric
knowledge are necessarily conditioned by capitalist economic
imperatives. Johnson and McRuer introduce the concept of cripiste-
mology by discussing the forms of knowledge that neoliberal health
economies produce: “Hypostasized beneath neoliberalism, a global
psychopharmaceutical industry compels targeted consumers to know
about and from a space of impairment: ‘Ask your doctor,’ Big
Pharma instructs the consumer, ‘if Cymbalta is right for you’” (128).
Within a neoliberal health paradigm, “right for you” invariably
entails treatment that allows a return to or intensification of work.
McRuer and Johnson contend that working against these “[n]eolib-
eral disability epistemologies” involves “challenging subjects who
confidently ‘know’ about ‘disability,’ as though it could be a thor-
oughly comprehended object of knowledge” (128, 130).
The attention deficit subject occupies a strange position in rela-
tion to neoliberal disability epistemologies because, as I discussed
above, she is not yet fully known. Yet just as her attention deficit
exists in relation to an idealized future productivity, so is her condi-
tion framed by anticipated scientific knowledge. While this knowl-
edge is still pending, the attention deficit subject must prove her
authenticity in order to access treatment. The blankness that frames
the assembled fragments of Why Did I Ever may be seen to evoke
the yet-to-be known that surrounds attention disorders. Rather than
awaiting population by future medical certainties, however,
Robison’s blank space is one element of her return to minimalist
aesthetics—a return that deploys irony and parody to destabilize di-
chotomies between the inaccessible past of trauma and the yet-to-
be-known future of ADD.
Why Did I Ever’s return to minimalism is self-conscious and
interrogative, concerned above all to deflate the assumptions about
knowledge embedded in the term’s diagnostic deployment. In a re-
velatory passage, Robison parodies Hemingway’s controlled econ-
omy with an oblique reference to the famous six-word story
regularly, if inaccurately, attributed to him: “For sale: baby shoes,
never worn.” Staying in a hotel for work, Money produces an alter-
native version of the story:
Left below the bed for me—a baby’s Stride Rite shoe.
I’m wondering about it, as I’m in bed and preparing for
sleep, telling myself it’s fine that a terrific baby stayed here be-
fore me and there is no reason to believe the stay ended in trag-
edy just because the baby left behind its shoe. There. On to the
next thing. I’m wondering, when do you ever see the truly
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attractive Christian men? I want to ride to church in a black van
full of French-ski-champ-looking Christians. That, to me, would
be the way to go. (114–15).
This is an ADD revision of Hemingway’s “tip of the iceberg” aes-
thetic principle, which, as Cynthia Whitney Hallett has observed,
suggests that seven-eighths of the story lies beneath its surface.12
The 1980s account of minimalism’s attention deficit riffs off the
iceberg metaphor: for the likes of Bell, minimalist writing is like a
fraudulent iceberg that advertises its tip but yields nothing under the
sea’s surface. Robison’s version of “baby shoes” refuses the sugges-
tive restraint of the iceberg. It develops instead a digressive tenor
that both intensifies and obscures the association of the baby shoe
with death. If the “original” six-word story relies on the expectation
of interpretive universality for its affective charge, Robison’s new
version pierces its allusive certainty and queries what an abandoned
baby shoe can really tell us about the fate of its wearer.
This deflationary rewriting, from one perspective, wholly
embraces the kind of minimalism caricatured by Bell or Aldridge, in
which the project of interpretation has been abandoned for lack of
evidence. The “original” story yields an impression of certainty: we
infer confidently that a baby has died. Robison’s parody, in contrast,
emphasizes uncertainty: we can never know what happened to the
baby, just as we can never reach a final, exhaustive explanation for
Money’s behavior. Under the minimalism of descriptive psychiatry,
Robison’s hyperactive psychological response to the baby shoe
would be read as a meaningless symptom of her ADD rather than a
meaningful symptom of her traumatized preoccupation with vio-
lence and death. Indeed, Why Did I Ever holds these two possibili-
ties in suspension: Money has ADD and she is afraid of violence
and death in the wake of her son’s ordeal.
I refer to the “original story” in quotation marks because even
though it is popularly attributed to Hemingway, “For sale: baby
shoes, never worn” has no definitive source. Robison’s repurposing
of this anonymously authored story is part of the novel’s broader
preoccupation with the role of copying and fakery in both aesthetic
and clinical judgment. Critics of minimalism often shared an anxiety
that the mode might be fraudulent: a hoodwink designed to trick the
critic. This anxiety is at work in Broyard’s review of Robison, in
which he wonders whether she might be fooling him—whether her
work’s small scale might be a sign of aesthetic poverty rather than
innovative constraint. Why Did I Ever wryly refers to such critical
anxieties by making Money a keen art forger, as we learn in Episode
14: “For my living room I have forged three paintings and signed
them all ‘Robert Motherwell.’ The paintings aren’t that successful
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really as I went too fast. They might fool a rich fellow who doesn’t
expect to see a fake if anyone like that ever comes over here” (5).
This passage makes it clear that Money’s forgeries are not seri-
ous attempts to make money; later in the same episode, we learn
that her faked Thomas Mann inscription in a copy of Buddenbrooks
(1901) reads, improbably, “Party girl. Bring back my VCR” (5). Her
copies appear as a form of research—an attempt to probe notions of
authenticity as they operate in both aesthetic economies and medical
ones. When Money’s daughter Mev confides that she has been pre-
senting a soft drink instead of a urine sample at the methadone
clinic, Money reassures her, “You won’t get caught” (2). Another
chapter ends, “I’m admiring this letter I forged from the IRS. It
reads: ‘You are paid in full’” (88). Holding institutionally sanctioned
forms of evidence up for mockery, these passages underline
Money’s refusal, or inability, to conform to the ideal model of the
socially responsible and economically productive ADD patient.
Money’s friend Hollis critiques her Rothko: “What’s missing
here is a focal point . . . Something for our eyes to fix on, finally, and
rest upon. Something we end up gazing at” (6). If the charge recalls
literary critical accusations of minimalist literature’s lack of focus,
then Money’s response—“It’s! A! Copy!”—takes refuge in literary
minimalism’s allegedly fatal weakness: its formulaic flatness. Money
compares her Rothko forgery favorably to the real thing: “I’m fairly
proud of the Rothko I forged for my bedroom. Whereas the blacks in
the paintings at the Rothko Chapel can look a little steely and cold,
my blacks are rich with the colors of hot embers and dark earth” (5).
While this passage pokes fun at Money—does she really think she is
better than Mark Rothko?—it also draws out a tension between
notions of minimalism as a formulaic and cold aesthetic mode and
Why Did I Ever’s subversion of these tropes. In fact, Money’s ADD
manifests as a failure to make accurate copies. She admits that she
“went too fast” with her Motherwell, and her version of the baby
shoes story is not really a copy at all, partly because its author is un-
known and partly because she so decisively transforms the story’s
style. Dispelling the critical equation of attention disorders and formu-
laic art, Money cannot make the perfect copy if she tries.
The novel’s references to visual art might especially be read in
light of Robison’s complaint that the term minimalism was misap-
propriated from painting. Despite Robison’s stated resistance to
comparisons between literary minimalism and minimal art, the mod-
ular form of Why Did I Ever does recall visual works of the 1960s.
The serial structure of Robison’s two post-2000 novels may very
well bear a comparison to minimal art more readily than her canoni-
cal minimalist stories of the 1970s and 1980s. Like the serial instal-
lations of Donald Judd, Carl Andre, or Sol LeWitt, Why Did I Ever
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lacks a center: Robison has averred that “if you read the pages in re-
verse order, they work about the same” (M. Murray). With the mod-
ularity of Why Did I Ever, Robison self-consciously rises to the
unstated challenge posed by the “minimalist” label that has chased
her throughout her career: Is it possible, the novel implicitly asks, to
produce a work of literature that can feasibly bear the same descrip-
tor as works of minimal art? In the very act of mimicking it, how-
ever, Robison distances her work from minimal art’s nonmimetic
commitments. With this paradoxical move, Robison addresses ques-
tions of transmedial commensurability: Money’s bad copies are, af-
ter all, only accessible through the written word.
These tensions are part of Why Did I Ever’s broader engagement
with the problem of description. Rewriting Hemingway, forging
Mann’s signature, and copying a Rothko are all ways of calling into
question the critical caricature of flat minimalist verisimilitude: to
merely redescribe the world, Robison implies, is never so easy. An ex-
change between Money and her boyfriend, Dix, brings this point home:
“You’re saying?” Dix asks me.
“What I’m saying,” I tell him.
“But you mean?” he asks.
“Same as the words mean,” I say. (54)
This dismissal of the very possibility of interpretation emerges again
in the novel’s representation of Money’s therapeutic treatments for
ADD, which take the notion of tautological description to the ex-
treme. In a session with her therapist, she questions the purpose of
the therapeutic writing tasks she has been assigned:
“No more journal,” I tell him. “I’m never bringing it to
therapy again. All my time, any hour, any day of the week, is
wasted. Pointless to record where or how.”
“Nor am I keeping any more organizational lists. I’ll show
you why,” I say. “Here, you can read this. Its reminders are,
one, ‘sweater’, two, ‘read newspaper.’
“I can’t,” I say, crumpling the page, “be this pitiful.”
(37–38)
But Money does attempt some of these organizational strategies.
She labels everything in the kitchen—“SINK, COUNTER,
CABINETS, CLOCK, DOOR, REFRIGERATOR”—but still finds
she can’t remember where to store a bag of potatoes and ends up
putting them out in the yard (102).
In these episodes, organizational strategies for people with
ADD evoke the harshest critical caricatures of Robison and her peers
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during the 1980s. Money’s ADD management strategies, and her
curt reference to what “the words mean,” result in a form of writing
that leaves no room for the work of interpretation (of course a sink
is a sink). Yet if Money’s actions pastiche what Barth calls minimal-
ism’s childlike “Dick-and-Jane” mode, they are also a serious nego-
tiation with the no man’s land between the absurdity of descriptive
mimesis and the impossibility of interpretation. In a doomed attempt
to organize her domestic life, Money tries color-coding her house by
painting every object, even her computer keyboard. She admits, “I
shouldn’t have coated gold on the numeric keys. The alphabet I can
touch-type but the ampersand is where in the hell?” (55)
In “Building a Better Description,” Love, Best, and Marcus
urge a reassessment of descriptive tautology with the argument that
“[i]f we free ourselves from the demand that everything be related to
a grand theory or yield surplus knowledge, we might come to see
even tautological description in a better light.” Such an embrace of
tautology, they add, might remake description as a “noninstrumental
accumulation of particulars with no immediately clear purpose”
(14). Despite this appeal to noninstrumentality, the article moves on
the same page to endorse description for its attention-enhancing
qualities.13 Robison’s version of tautological description is far re-
moved from this one: for Money, it is one thing to call a sink a sink
but quite another to remember where the potatoes are stored. If tau-
tological description improves attention for Love, Best, and Marcus,
and marks out the expandable limits of psychiatric knowledge in the
DSM, in Why Did I Ever, it emblematizes the failure of therapy and
the persistence of attention deficit disorder.
At the same time, however, the novel attests to the impossibil-
ity of pure mimetic description—and, in doing so, it makes ADD the
site on which minimalist sparseness and hyperactive excess con-
verge. The novel’s representation of Money’s writing life points to
the limitations of the concept of deficit for an understanding of ADD
writing—and, perhaps, for an understanding of the condition itself.
Trying to hold onto a job on a terrible big-budget film called
Bigfoot, Money is instructed by her antagonist, producer Belinda,
not to “get creative” (45). She makes a resolution: “I won’t cut any-
thing, I’ll just add” (85). Committing to this decision by adding an
array of absurd details to the script, Money eventually takes her ad-
ditive writing philosophy to the limits of sense: “It isn’t anything but
as I’m writing my notes for tomorrow I fill up a page and don’t turn
to a new page. I just press down hard with my pen and write over
the top of what I’ve already written” (78). Money’s refusal to cut
represents the antithesis of Lish’s editing practice. These descrip-
tions of Money’s writing align Why Did I Ever with Tell Me: both
works undo—whether symbolically or literally—Lish’s commitment
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to spare writing and represent Robison’s project as a reversal of ca-
nonical minimalist style. They also suggest that any attempt to de-
fine “ADD aesthetics” must contend with the condition’s resistance
to diagnostic certainty.
In drawing attention to the limits of knowledge about attention
disorders, Robison challenges some of the presumptions of the de-
scriptive psychiatry that shaped post-1980 editions of the DSM. The
DSM’s concerted marking of its own epistemological limits can be
said to deploy a form of minimalism, but the manual’s resistance to
interpretation constitutes a paradox. By flagging up the absence of
secure, empirical evidence, the handbook leaves a blank space for a
speculation relentlessly conditioned by a neoliberal imaginary of sci-
entific certainty, enhancement, and productivity. Why Did I Ever
destabilizes such neurobiological speculation through an insistent fo-
cus on Money’s subjective experience, which deprivileges institu-
tional investments in static classification. The DSM’s minimalism
hints at the limitlessness of the psychiatric knowledge that lies below
the tip of the iceberg. In contrast, Robison writes in a spirit of cripis-
temological unknowing, holding the dual possibilities of trauma and
ADD in suspension without making ADD’s mute symptoms the site
of future empirical proof and correction.
Robison’s cripistemological writing has implications for prac-
tices of literary labeling too. The critics referred to in this article si-
multaneously deploy and disavow the term minimalism, because
it—like ADD—seems to resist interpretive mastery. This kind of lit-
erary diagnosis secures the boundaries of the canon by stigmatizing
forms of writing deemed to be in deficit. My reading of Why Did I
Ever demonstrates that this mode of diagnostic reading is incompati-
ble with the fact that attention disorders, like many other neurobeha-
vioral conditions, can be lived without being fully known. Alert to
this context, Robison’s cripistemological writing captures the every-
day textures through which attention disorders are made, within and
beyond psychiatric and literary description.
Notes
1. This article has benefited from the generous feedback of three anonymous peer
reviewers and audiences at King’s College London, the University of East Anglia,
and Birkbeck, University of London. Thanks also to James Mansfield for reading
and commenting on multiple drafts. This work was funded by an ISSF award from
Birkbeck and the Wellcome Trust (Grant Number 204770/Z/16/Z).
2. See Peter Conrad and Deborah Potter, “From Hyperactive Children to ADHD
Adults: Observations on the Expansion of Medical Categories,” Social Problems,
vol. 47, no. 4, 2000, pp. 559–82.
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3. The notion that patterns of attention shape, and are shaped by, practices of read-
ing and writing is by no means confined to the late twentieth century, of course.
Nicholas Dames, for instance, has argued that the physiological novel theory of the
nineteenth century was particularly marked by a curiosity about the interactions of
literature and attention. In The Physiology of the Novel (2007), Dames notes that a
“good way of categorizing a critical school or critical practice is to define the pitch,
intensity, and duration of readerly attention that it employs and seeks to make
normative” (13). The twentieth-century critics I examine here were interested in sim-
ilar questions, but their focus was trained specifically on the waning attention span:
they were concerned that minimalist literature made normative a pathologically defi-
cient form of attention.
4. For an account of Lish’s compositional “logic” and its influence on American
fiction beyond the minimalist paradigm, see David Winters, “Theory and the
Creative Writing Classroom: Conceptual Revision in the School of Gordon Lish,”
Contemporary Literature, vol. 57, no. 1, 2016, pp. 111–34. Winters notes, “If Lish’s
reception as a minimalist reflects a misleadingly small sample size, it also impedes a
complete understanding of his teaching” (115).
5. A prominent instance of this reading is Mark McGurl’s comment on the way
women minimalists “reverse the seeming affinity of minimalism with silent mascu-
linity, making it work to record and manage the trauma of female experience” (The
Program Era: Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing [2009], 69).
Andrew Hoberek also highlights trauma in his discussion of minimalism’s affinities
with the Vietnam novel, see “Foreign Objects, or, DeLillo Minimalist,” Studies in
American Fiction, vol. 37, no. 1, 2010, pp. 101–25. Doherty offers a different inter-
pretation of the relationship between minimalism and Vietnam, positioning “state-
supported minimalism as a means of restoring collective identity, not simply as an
expression of personal psychological trauma” (90).
6. Hoberek’s exemplary summary (pp. 101–25) states that “minimalism arose to
challenge the prominence of the big, nonrealistic postmodern novel associated with
writers like Thomas Pynchon, John Barth, and Robert Coover” (103).
7. Here Puar quotes Jack Halberstam’s contention that “[a]ny cripistemology
worth its name should identify modes of not knowing, unknowing, and failing to
know” (qtd. in Johnson and McRuer, “Proliferating Cripistemologies” 152).
8. Attention and distraction are key concerns in maximalist postmodern literature
too. Though I lack the space to explore them here, maximalist texts, including
Franzen’s The Corrections (2001) and Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996) and unfinished
novel The Pale King (2011), all focus on forms of cognitive enhancement and deficit
correction. This indicates the way the minimalism/maximalism binary in contempo-
rary US literature structures concerns about the malleability, whether chemical or
cultural, of attention and distraction.
9. This move anticipates Carver’s Beginners (2009), a posthumously published
volume consisting of the unedited manuscript of his story collection What We Talk
About When We Talk About Love (1981), which was heavily edited by Lish.
However, the stories published in Tell Me are not unedited—rather, they replace the
Lish-edited versions with the Angell-edited versions—and so the book does not
evoke notions of authorly authenticity in the manner of Beginners.
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10. See M. Murray, “Interview with Mary Robison”; Barth, “A Few Words About
Minimalism.”
11. Barth taught and mentored Robison and has praised her work in unequivocal
terms from her career’s beginning.
12. Hallett, in Minimalism and the Short Story (1999), draws a contrast between
Hemingway’s iceberg principle and “the Minimalist artist’s ‘whole ice cube’ effect,
with which all that is seen is all that there is” (1). The modular structure of much
minimal artwork complicates Hallett’s distinction between the ice cube and the ice-
berg: the repeated forms of a Judd installation, for instance, contain the ever-present
possibility of further replication, suggesting that the ice cube might not be a self-con-
tained whole after all. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer who raised this point
about minimal art and process.
13. Since the 2001 publication of Why Did I Ever, a new public narrative of crisis
around attention and distraction has gained prominence in the context of the rise of
digital media. These narratives are, undoubtedly, an important context for Marcus,
Love, and Best’s appeals to description as a strategy for honing readerly attention.
See also Felski’s endorsement of phenomenology’s “willingness to attend rather
than to analyze” (107).
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